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DIALOG I CAL SOVERE I 
PRELIMINARY METAPHORICAL MDSINGS
Craig Scott*
The problem of the interrelationship of the basisand superstructures... can be el 
significant degree through the material 
of the word.
(T)he essence of this problem comes down to howactual existence (the how
sign reflects and refracts existence in its process 
generation.
What is important about the word... 
its sign puri ty as its social ubiaui The word is
implicated in literally each and every act or contact
between people. 
running th~ugh 
of social intercourseregister effect in the word.. It 
then, that the word is the most sensitive 
index 
social chanaes
, and what is more, of changes still in
the process of growth, still without definitive shape
and not as yet accommodated into 
and full y defined ideological 
the capacity to register 
fansi tory, momentary phases of social change.
If it may be assumed that ' Sovereignty ' and its aspirationalcounterpart ' Sel f-Determination ' are inguistic signs under siege
in contemporary discourses 
of international law and pol tics,how is ate Twentieth Century "existence" being " ref 1 
refracted" in these all-governing words and how is it that we
should respond? fl e enti tiedSovereign God, Sovereign State, Sovereign 
, reproduces a
Assistant Professor of Law, Uni versi of Toronto.
N. Volosinov, Marxism and the Philoso~hy of Lanauaae 19 (L.Matejka R. 
original J. 
simply a 
revol utionary 
of much of currentsocial dialogicality of social existence. For Marxism andthe of Lanauaae is "ninety percent... Bakhtin see Caryl Introduction in M.M. The Dialoaic xxvi(Michael Holquist 
trans., 1981) 
of the debate and its
significance, see Michael Gardiner, The Dialoaics of Cri tiaue: M.
Bakhtin and the of Ideoloay 2, Gardiner, I wi 
and Bakhtin as 
whether or not they are the same person.
66 Notre Dame Law Review 1355 (1991).
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descrjption by Perry Anderson in his Lineaaes of the Absolute
state of Europe s system of law and political organization as
a patchwork of overlapping and incomplete rights of
government. . . 
... (with). . different juridical instances.. 
interwoven and stratified, 
suzerainties and anomalous enclaves (abounding)''' Elshtain
responds in rhe following Is this any way to run a
continent.
Europe. A 
Sovereignty being reaffirmed in the most absolute sense as the
focus of resurgent nationalist aspiration even as movements for
local, non-statist autonomy and international supra-statist
structures tug on state Sovereignty from above and from 
All that may be granted, but surely Anderson s description is
overstated, if not melodramatic. 
His account is sti 
manage things 
As it transpires, in the above quotation it was actually
Europe s medieval past 
current upheaval. 
in the course of a more or 
the kind of state of affairs that helped lead to a 
need for a near-absolute conception of sovereignty which would
locate (ideally) indivisibl
r' inalienable and supremesovereignty ' in the State. 
would take is precisely one of a lesson 
which part of the story of historical progress has been the
emergence of the State ci vi 1 ize hope! ess
fragmentation and chaos Whatever social forces are now at
work and whatever pathologies state sovereignty may now 
the 
of chaotic world.
However, I am far from convinced that we should be investing
our conceptual and practical energies in seeking to head off thiskind of world. 
We are along for the 
pol i 
taking a management east, we owe it to
oursel ves to 
the pages of our history books that is not 
al so desi rabl e 
one of rethinking, both imaginati 
Anderson, Lineaqes of the Absolute State (1974).
EI OD. ci t . at 1366, quoting ibid . at 20,23.
EI ibid
Elshtain, o~. ci at 
theories of sovereignty of Bodin and 
Elshtain, oD. cit. at 1366.
the classical
- 269 -
as individuals, groups and societies live in a world where 
conscious pi ural 
seeking to transform) colonization by forces of standardization
and normalization (even as new in their stead). 
fragmentation and chaos (negative charac~erization)" we may want
to ask whethe
f we should be fostering and heteronomy(good word)"
I approach these thoughts convinced that theorizing about
domestic legal and 
face, and theorizing about internationa 
continue to be as isolated from each other as they have tended tobe. 
toward increasing fluidity and complexity in the way in whichboth egal maps and maps of personal identity, wi 
current states, are being drawn as we move into the Twenty-firstCentury. I 
relationship between the claims and discourses associated with
the international human rights process and the claims and
discourses associated with processes of state formation and
dissol ution, 
rights. If 
they can, I would suggest, be approached as intersecting and
overlapping sovereignty discourses, 
insights into how we can break out of seeing ' jurisdiction ' and
rights ' as two different and compartmentalized aspects of the
consti tutional 
Instead, we can imaginati 
both individuals and 
Perhaps the best example of such a conjoined process is
almost certainly the Draft 
Indigenous Peoples, ' about which more will 
the moment, it is worth noting that part of what we appear to be
on the cusp of is expressed by the lead 
, the current all indigenous peoples arefree and equal in digni 
. wi th 
indi vidual s and peopl es to be di to consider themsel 
different, and to be respected as such."l 
coincidence that on the very day of this conference panel on the
futur~ of sovereignty, the announcement of the awarding of the
Nobel Peace Prize to Guatemalan indigenous leader Rigoberta
Ibid
currently being drafted by the Working Group on 
Populations, a sub-organ of the United Nations Sub-Commission on
the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities.
For the latest published Re~ort of the WorkinG GrOUDon , U.N. 
E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/1992/33 (20 August 1992), Annex 44 (henceforth,
Draft Declaration).
.nu..g. at 44.
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Menchu greets us on the front page 
The web that links us to her is 
politics of identity and the pursuit of equality and unity in
difference know no boundaries, to use a worn-out cliche and adidactic metaphor. 
n woman whose autobiographical
narrati ve, I. Riaoberta Menchu , has been at the centre of the
attempt to open the literary canon to new perspectives and voices
in basic courses across American and, to some extent Canadian
university campuses 
backlash against such ' subversion This is also the woman who
has spent '" 11 years.. 
Uni ted 
extremely difficult to accept thnt we have to negotiate " humanrights -- but we have done 
in her Nobel acceptance speech and in comments made in Canada
shortly before that . speech, called for the adoption of the DraftUniversal Declaration as a 
Quincentennial but also of the passage from a relationship of
oppression to one of "' mutual respect, where indigenous peopl 
wi II l 1 i ve deciding thei r '" 4
photo with byline, "Peacemaker The Globe and Mail , October
17, 1992, at AI. see Associated Press,
Guatemal an Indian The Globe
and Mail , October 17, 
Rigoberta Menchu, I. Riaoberta 
Guatemala (Elisabeth 
1983) .
Graham Fraser, "Nobel Peace Pri ze 
Menchii: Wor I The Globe
and Hail , November 
Andre Picard, "Nobel Peace Prize 
acti vist reI ' symbol of tical
. prisoners, ' Menchu decl ares The Globe , November 
1992, at A3. It is no longer
acceptable to exclude whole peoples from national and international
all iances. earn to live together in peace, as brothers
and sisters. " And ater, she commented on why she does not see the
struggle for rights of the Mayan people in Guatemala as leading to
an We country that 
pI ural 
don t think we can have an indigenous 
at the end of the 20th century : Fraser, OD. ci . These passages
are quite ill ustrative 
sel f the ' national' and ' international' 
struggles for recognition. 
sel f-determination, 
terms of 
observation that aboriginal 
often eschew traditional statehood as the 
their claim (even if the ultimate power to invoke the right to be
a state is never CI aims 
Non-State Groups in , 25 Cornell Int' I 
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1 would I ike 
consciously seek to borrow from strands of both state sovereignty
and democratic sovereignty discourses that embrace presumptive
respect for concrete di 
hand, and diffusion of the democratic 
participation, on the other 
va 1 
oursel ves up to 
to as varieaated sovereianty and procedural sovereianty
According to the 
part of a dialectical and largely 
recogni tion as 
. defini tions ' sel f-defini tions resul 
the formation of the identity of the various actors participating
wi 
emerge many different 
whose ' international I ' may consist of a
different bundle of 
bundl es into ' sovereign ' and ' non- sovereign ' at risk of glossing
over by fiat the diversity and richness of identities and
concrete responses to concrete probl fe.
According to the second 
of sovereignty takes on a radical proceduralist dimension whereby
the monovocal and monolithic voice of the ' people
' "
dissolvers)into processes of intersubjectivi imi ting tsel 
democratic procedures and to the ambitiotls presuppositions of their implementation These participatoryprocesses and procedures of the ' publ ' presuppose and
feed into official state (and 
themsel ves forming 
Together these two dimensions might be said to produce an
umbrella conception of sovereignty that emphasizes dialogicalprocesses of coli ecti 
dialogues, amongst societies-in-the-world and amongst
indi vidual s-&-groups-in-society, merge wi 
481 (1992). See also James Anaya, " Indigenous Rights Norms in
Contemporary International Law , 8 Arizona JI. of 
1 (1991) for consideration by an aboriginal scholar of the need for
aboriginal sel fy full (or at leasttraditionally-conceived) statehood and a corollary need to channel
respect for aboriginal status in creative and varieddirections.
Jurgen 1st der Sti llstand 
normativer Begriff der Offentlichkeit" in Die Ideen von 1789 in der
deutschen RezeDtion 7, 30-31 
ed., 1989) as auoted in translation by Seyla Benhabib, Situatinathe f: Gender. 
Ethics note 43, 119 ' most recent writing
on the subject of the public sphere made famous in The structural
Transformation of the Public SDhere (Thomas Burger 1989)(1962). 
public sphere as it Kenneth
Baynes, The Normative Grounds of 
Habermas 77-121, 174-181 
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normative standards that seek both to regulate and constitute
communal 
be simultaneously applicable to both the ' domestic ' realm (within
the territorial state s legal order) and the ' international'
realm (outside the territorial state s legal order), constantly
querying this distinction even while constantly usin
ft it (contingently) necessary conceptual reference point.
By dialogue, I mean little more than 
conversations between 
in which the ' intersubjective ' generation of norms (and their
interpretive application) is intimately tied to 
construction of identity through reciprocal 
than either identity or normative standards being established
from within (subjectively) or without 
forged .through the communicative interchange between subjects, as
well as through the "dialogic interaction between concrete
utterances" outsiRe of the ' pure ' dialogic situation of " face-to-
face speech acts The regulative ideal of dialogue may be
stated to be that of achieving intersubjective consensus or
mutual assent (as to the ' bet ' in the context in
question) through rhetorical processes of 
- the giving of reasons and counter- reasons, cl 
counter-cl aiming, viewing 
fi-viewing. insti tutionall y-structured contexts, 
approximated and provisional I 
purposes at hand, but such pragmatic dialogical 
not obscure the fact that in virtually all modern 
gi ven (normative) and
always imprinted, even deeply 
In this sense, norms very rarely approximate let alone match up
to the above-mentioned regul ecting, in ei 
To gi ve one exampl 
have a 
contacts as between themsel 
states and their 
standpoint that makes sense of call transnational' right
. even as it could be said 
have a right which i partakes of the ' international' 
does not require validation by reference to states: Operative
Paragraph, Draft Declaration, OD. cit. at 51.
Gardiner, 01'. ci t. at 12, discussing Vol osinov ' s view that 
continuous I ow of 
. . . is
the fundamental reality of the phenomenon of In another
summary of Vol osinov ' s 
makes the language (being) dynamic process, a
. ceasel ess I ow of becoming '" and " I anguage competence (being) 
simp I y matter correctsentences, but rather indicat 
gi ven speech- act by parti cui 
social situations : Ibid. at 
In the broadl defined Habermasian dialogical tradi 
measure of the 
social, political and see Benhabib, 01'. cit.54-5.
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their general articul 
appl ~e actuall y affected 
legitimately interested in the Thus, any given norm
(whether it be a statement regarding the division of
jurisdictional power or with respect to a right against
government) is a si 
context of a foundational concept like 
competing understandings of what concrete arrangements and
actions are generated by the 
el usi veness of linguistic ' sign ' wi 
social struggle for meaning in which dominant 
interests always have an interest in denying the dialogicality of
a concept, that fiss to new
voices as well as to its 
Existence reflected in sign is not merely
ref 1 ref racted How is this ref 
existence in the 
intersecting of differently oriented social interests
wi by the
cl ass st ruaal e
Cl ass does 
e. with the community which is the totality of the
users of the same set of signs for ideological
communication. 
one and the same 
Thus, a 
Janus-faced because it 
difference to sameness: steven G. Gey, "The Unfortunate Revival
of Civic Republicanism , 141 U. Pa. Law Rev. 801, 833-854 
In my view, the regul 
to be 
virtually all practical 
. access to 
recogni tion ' of 
. belie ' what 
misrecogni tion Taylor, Mul ticul The Pol i 
Recoanition 25 see John Culture 
Domination 232 (1987) on the "blocking" of mutual recognition in
si tuations 
distilling a new monologue (consensus) from the liberating idea dialogue. consensus ' is as much a 
accept a current and temporary 
a consensus over the substantive val 
the dialogue.
VoI o~. ci t . at 23-4 
Vol osinov, 
struggle to a class struggle. 
ideological patterns can be reduced to 
a range of grounds for making distinctions or ' othering , such that
the following quoted passage cl ass" included
such bases of 
reference to "contradiction" in the singular should be understood
as "contradictions" in the pi 
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oriented accents intersect in every ideological sign.
Sign becomes an arena of the class struggle.
This social multiaccentuality of the ideologicalsign is a very crucial aspect. 
thanks to this intersecting of accents that a sign
maintains its vitality and dynamism and the capacity
for further development. 
wi thdrawn from 
struggl e. . inevi tably 
allegory and becoming the object not of live 
intelligibility but of philological Thehistorical memory of mankind is 
ideological signs incapable of serving as arenas for
the clash of live social accents....
The very same thing that makes the ideological
sign vital and mutable is 
makes it a refracting and distorting medium. 
rul ing cl ass strives 
character to the ideological sign, to extinguish or
dri ve inward the struggl 
judgments which occurs in 
uniaccentual.
In actual fact, each living ideological sign has
two faces, I 
become a word of praise, any current truth must
inevitably sound to many other people as the greatestlie. inner dialectic quality of the sign comesout full 
revol utionary 
life, the cont 
sign cannot emerge in an establ 
reactionary and 
preceding factor in the dialectical flux of the 
generati ve process, s truth
as to make it appear today' s. 
Thus, we might wish to think of sovereignty as a 
prism ref I ecting 
over who we are (identi 
flgues) and how together (normative dialogues) , 
di al ogues by ight enters theprism by passing through all of the faces of the prism 
small in surface area), light 
t rajectori es that 
those faces which correspond to establ 
ideologies.
For a category ofdialogue, which sees identi ty 
as being an inextri see Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric ofMoti ves (1969). See al so Frost, Towards a Norma 
International Relations (1986) for 
recogni tion 
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As wi 
say is meant to argue that ' states ' would not or 
wi 
of the abstract ' State ' for conceptual izing social 
normati ve reI 
say is that sovereignty and statehood should no longer be viewed
as coterminous, and that sovereignty should be accepted as
something to be spread around and as something that
simultaneously bears a multitude of 
sovereignty and its 
the right to be sovereign) are words whose distribution is
something to be constantly argued about implication 
privileged in any instance is also something to be faced. awing forcibl e
intervention may be seen as a 
other actors even as the kind of substantive condi 
qual i fy 
the right of non-intervention as between the various 
some respects, this does represent ' merely ' a definitional move
that strips states of near-exclusive control of the word
sovereignty ' but, in so doing, opens the door to some new word
to describe the bundl 
However, the notion of 
stabi I izing pressures that 
' statehood'
synonymous with ' sovereignty On this view, ' statehood' would
be the compendious description of the bundle of rights and duties
that dialogues over sovereignty have parcell 
terri toriall 
states.
Perry Dane, in a stimulating foray into what the school
known as ' I egal pi ural ism ' has to say about sovereignty in the
context of relations between aboriginal
society, says that in "stress(ingJ the expansive, 
potential of sovereignty-talk" we (bJut where
does it end?" The framework for his 
as' follows:
One instinct, apparent in some 
legal pluralism on which this essay builds, is to
reject, in principl east, any imi ts 
concept of a legal 
association, group or institution can be a full-f legal regime. But this.. demands either too much ortoo 
non-state sovereignty might require the state todissolve. I ikel y, 
rights-talk. That 
There must be some way for the state to bring i 
encounter other 
identity as a legal 
the st
nte confronts is a order.
perry The Maps of 
Cardozo Law Review 991-2 (1991). A Meditation
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These concerns of Dane s, perhaps best summarized as the concern
about the division between 
legal pluralism as idealistic realism, must be kept in 
What kind of account of "non-state sovereignty , as he puts it,
is compatible with the desirability and reality of theinsti tutional 
wi II 
the answer in a set of ideal and 
The aspirations that lie behind the concepts of both
sovereignty ' and ' sel f-determination ' are so powerful, the
concepts themselves so general, the claims made in the name of
the concepts so fundamental and the historical fragments Qf
meaning circulating ~hrough the concepts so diverse that any
rendering of these ideas in terms of limi 
virtually by definition, suppressive of deeply felt (and deeplyfel t to 
communi ty. ' Sovereignty ' and ' sel f-determination ' (not unl 
human rights ) are the kind of all-encompassing, near-totalizing
conceptual rubrics that seek to explain and 
existence i tsel f. 
associate such all-encompassing concepts with metaphors that
themsel ves seek 
to be h
ftMan, to ' nature ' as social and linguisticbeings. 
Arnold 
convni " I infini te 
openness , which he radical plural ism , which he
advocates and defines as 
a more reI ati vi 
provisionally in recognition of the legitimate claims of
otherness" and difference. 
established but 
denial enforced by 
of alternatives.
Arnol d Krupat, The Voice in the Marain: Native American Li 
196 (1989).
In this 
still allows for 
(potentially) open to new voices and new 
See infra for Krupat' s view that while dialogue as infinite
openness leads view 
carnivalesque ' difference, 
a fluid and adaptabl cosmopol i tan" social ordering.
See Jennifer ConstitutionalDialogue " in Social Justice and the Consti 
a Social Union for Canada 59-83 (Joel Bakan and David Schneiderman
eds., 1992) 
rights as ' si tes of dialogue
, '
si tes of 
, relationships
' . 
all
words, they would in a 
were it not for the all- encompassing, near-total 
(fundamental) rights discourse.
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In order to understand the close connection between
identity and recognition, we have to take into account
a crucial feature of the human condi 
rendered almost invisible by the overwhelming
monological bent of mainstream modern phi osophy.
This crucial feature of human life 
fundamental dialoaical character. We 
agents, capabl 
of defining our identi 
rich human anguages of expression..... 
acqui re the eded for sel -defini tion ontheir own. 
interacti on wi 
Herbert Mead signi ficant others .... We 
our identity always in dialogue with, sometimes in
struggl e against, the 
want to see in ' discovering 
identi ty doesn t mean that 
but that I negotiate it through 
partly internal, wi 
development (in modern 
generated identity gives a new importance to
recogni tion. fiiall y dialogical rei 
My contention is that this identi ty for~ation not just of 
communities. 
Tayl or, o~. ci t. at 32-34. 
readi 1 
wi 11 al ways be wide 
stabl e social 
of recognition of 
shared understandings 
accounts of 
. wi II wi II 
. between
' ) . 
relatively recently that people have 
recognition of their own sense of in the
earlier age problem. 
recognition was built into the socially derived identity by virtue
of the very fact that that it was based on 
everyone took for granted" Taylor, ibid. at 
societies 
unchall enged social 
perceived or is denied. 
norms seem to flow naturally from within and without at the same
time.
See William Bloom, Personal identity, national identity and
international relations (1990). See also Michael Walzer, "TheMoral 
International Ethics 217-237 (Charl es R. 
I should not be understood as taking a position on the extent to
which we can speak of the existence of the group independently from
individuals, such that groups as such can interact. 
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of ' sovereignty ' to the cl 
legitimately make as and in the name of a political and 
order, this is in some sense a imi 
whole tradition that sees ' sovereignty ' as ultimately vindic~tedthrough respect for the autonomy of individual human beings.
Rather than taking this approach, I would like to Briefly draw
attention to the dialogical "dance of r~cognition that has
occurred over the past decade between aboriginal and non-
aboriginal societies and aboriginal and non-
aboriginal Dersons
the publ ic s Working Group on
Indigenous Populations and thfi renegade of that dialogical e counter. 
note for the moment that we do speak comfortably and pragmatically
of 
attribute(J moral to 
Ronald Dworkin, Law s Em~ire 168 (1986).
See , e.g., Conference on 
ODinions on Questions Arisina From the Dissolution of Yuaoslavia
31 Int' 1 1488 (1992). 
Commission, known otherwise as 
decide whether Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Croatia enjoyed
the right to sel f-determination. 
to self-determination as having group rights and individual rights
dimensions merging wi th minorityrights ' discourse. " (G) roups 
more ethnic, relgious or language have the right to
recognition of And,every individual 
rei igious or I Ibid. at 1497.
price, " Indian-Federal Regulations From the Inside 
Comment on Perry Dane s Medi tation
, 12 Cardozo Law review 1007,1008 (1991) (describing the Dane 
For an account of the Working Group process as a dialogical
encounter, Robert Wi Encounters on the Frontiers
. of 
Indigenous Peoples ' Survival in Duke Law JI. 660(1990). It is s description of
what ideally constitutes a "dialogic encounter" represents what, in
my view, has occurred 
Here one begins wi 
something to 
understanding. The 
posi tion stronaest possibl e 
always attempt to be 
saying 
sensi ti vi ty is pI ay, and-fro 
encounters, a seeking for a common ground in which we can
understand 
adversary or an opponent, but a 
Conf I 
because understanding does not entai 
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In view of the fact that the Working Group is a forum wi 
the ' human rights ' structures of the United Nations, ' it 
helpful to situate the construction of collective identity and
rights in a simi of construction indi vidual 
human beings engage in intima~ely- connected processes of identity
formation and norm generation As any student 
international law wi made in international law is a
discourse of recognition ' that suggests that collectivities
interact normatively in a similar 
this interaction can be reduced to the communicative interaction
amongst the diplomatic and other 
if they were the 
further in this paper, but it is way out'
Richard Bernstein, The New 
Horizons of Modernity/Postmodernity 336-7 (1992).
Bernstein al~o 
slip into "powerful centrifugal tendencies towards fragmentationby exal ting di 
infinite openness " criticized by oP. cit. , for its ownsake. In 
is in the context of a good faith commitment to dialoaue (used both
as verb and of a general 
dispositions committed to 
Others) in a conversational space between stability and change. this of dialogic 
fearfull y lash out at, "counter-tendencies (to fragmentation) - not
towards convergence, consensus, and harmony - 
down of boundaries, a ' loosening of old ' and dialogical
encounters 
conf I icts : Bernstein, ibid. at 339.
So much so that McDougal, 
I egal 
Every of prescription 
communication in which 
deeds to mediate their subiecti 
M. McDougal, The Inter~retation 
Aareements and World Public of Content and
Procedur~ xi auoted in Ian Johnstone,
Treaty Interpretation: The Authori of Interpretive Communi ties
" ,
12 Mich. Jl. of Int' I Law 317, 374 (1991). Much 
could be done relating the view of the New Haven School of law as
a process of communication to the project of Habermas and Habermas
scholars to 
communicative ethics 
Habermas ' project, see Jurgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness andCommunicative Action (Christian 
Nicholsen trans., The
PhilosoDhical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures (Frederick G.
Lawrence trans.., of such a
bringing together Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules. 
decisions: On the of practical and eaal reasonina ininternational rei (1989).
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of the interminabl 
being ' declaratory ' an~ as bei
ng ' constitutive ' is to the way it is nei That is to say, we cannot
ignore the fundamentally intersubiective nature of recognition,which is simply an offshoot of adopting an intersubjective and
dialogical view of personhood and normati ikenormativi ty, is 
consti tuted, 
others of whom we are and consti 
according to which both (or 
affect identi 
following observatio
n has arisen out of a discussion of ~he workof Benedict Anderson
.. .
Anderson s (analysis) enables the crucial
recogni tion ike gender -- national 
relational term whose identity derives its inherence in
a system of differences. 
manand ' woman ' define themselves reciprocally (though'
never symmetrically), national identi ty 
not on the basis of its own intrinsic properties but as
a function of what it 
some element of alterity for its definition
, a nationis inel uctabl shaped by what it Opposes But thevery fact that identi 
difference means that nations are ~orever haunted by
their various defini 
Just as the above passage makes evident that 
entail symmetry (while 
or reciproci ty should al 
of respect or power in the dialogue of 
easi ly 
powerfully down on the slave while the slave
s attempt to carveout a self-definitional space takes place in the context of
resistance to a ' dialogue ' whose terms the slave has ver~ little
Note that international egal usage is ambiguous wi to what ' decl aratory ' refers to. other enti ty ' decl aring ' its existence to the worl 
to unconditionally accept or it can refer to the 
actors in 
existence, and, in that declaring ' that fact. keep both usages, noting 
saying the same 
into it the kernels of the ' constitutive ' view of recognition (i.one does not really 
full y exist -- others have gazed upon 
you, accepted you and made 
of that acceptance.
Senedict Anderson, lmaoined Communities: Reflections on theOriain and Spread of Nationalism (1983).
Andrew Parker, Mary Russo, Doris Sommer, and Patricia Yaeger,Introduction
" in Nationalisms and Sexualities 5 (Parker, Russo,Sommer and Yaeger auotina Perry Anderson, "Nati on-States and Nati London Review of 3 (May 1991) .
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input into (at east ini tiall 34 
distortions in the recogni 
rather than the exception, such that it is sti 
recognition, as a sociological phenomenon, approximates the
consti tuti ve pol 
declaratory pole, especially where it can be said that the
dialogue of recognition is between society ~s a whole and new
status claimants. 
This is not to deny that there is a good case to be made that
even the master-slave dialogue still has elements of mutuality in
the sense 
(perhaps even most s gaze and that,
secondl y, each s iden ti ty 
of the interchange, even if the absence of mutual 
posi tion resul ts in both emerging ' misrecognized' or 
the first point, see Martha Minow, " Identi ties , 3 Yal e Jl. 
and the Humani ties 97, 102 (1991) in which Minow discusses various
works of literature, including some dealing with American slavery,
and points out:
People vested with 
exercise control over thei identi ties. 
craft images for others to different inner self.
See also Edward Said, culture and Imperialism (1992), Ch. 3,
Resistance and Opposition , 191-281.
On the second point, s " Independence and Dependenceof in G. F. 
Phenomenoloay of S~irit 111-119 (A. V. Miller trans., 1977) 
and the discussion in Charles Taylor, op. cit. , at 36, 50; see also
Minow, ibid. at 
Connor s "The Displaced Person" in Flannery O' Connor, CollectedWorks 285 (1988).
such a ' dialogue ' tends more 
recogni tion of sameness, recognizing oursel in understandings onto others.
Arguably, the societal gaze s consti tuti ve effect 
and less univocal the more the 
posi tion which position can be
achieved through strategies 
those with identical or similar status claims or through entering
into a dialogue with society on the basis of the claimant' s status
as a comnuni 
tended to achieve a measure of 
these two avenues. ' society I the ' international community ' as the 
processes of 
procedures of admission to membership, but al 
degrees of 
institution: see John Dugard, Recoanition and the United Rations(1987). (implicit) claim that recognition is both
becoming more and more collectivized (and thus ' constitutive ' in
nature) and, in the process, that new criteria for statehood have
been added to the traditional effectiveness criteria (thus setting
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reciprocal or negotiated nature of identity 
related participation in processes of norm-creation and
interpretation) is undeniable, the reciprocity or negotiations
may be formal in the extreme:
Merel y 
the contributions of readers to the meaning of texts
and of outsiders to the meanings of identity -- should
not supplant needed attention to the patterns of
social, pol tical, and economic power within which
people relate. These 
against which individuals may push, but each person is
si tuated di fferent I 
. . . The s own experiences and social
posi tion ' expectations ~d
practices stack the negotiations over 
Within the conscious strategy of coalitions of 
Peoples strategically to use the fora and processes provided byinternational insti tutions, starting 
and, of late, by way of the complex of United Nations human
rights bodies and acti 
parameters for ' decl are thei r 
expectation of recognition from others on the basis 
declaration), it strong dialogical i ty 
recognizers) can nonetheless be observed. 
discourse of 
' ), 
cannot be ignored that ' sovereignty ' has been infused
wi th 
that struggl ' construction of the
normative universe in 
reI ationship 
societies to become a relationship of domination. 
period of high colonialism ended with the 1960s 
significantly from the 
effectiveness, due to the juridical effects created by the powerful
sel f-determination principl e, 
societal (incl 
See Robert Ouasi -states: 
relations and the Third World (1990). 
that, wi thin 
sovereignty discourses, the dial ectic normative
acknowledgement" , has always melded 
equal and difference based on I seeRichard CuI tural 
Protection of Human Rights in Human RiQhts 
Perspective: A Ouest for Consensus 44, 48 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Naed., discussion of normative
acknowledgement" see also Richard Falk, "The Rights of (Especially RevitalizinQ
International Law 199-220 (1989).
Minow, OP. cit. at 110. Recall also Volosinov, OP. cit. , and
the discussion of refraction in the ideological 
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negotiations of identity between Aboriginal Peoples and States is
all too obvious. 
all context of statist(and other ideological) hegemony, Robert Williams
, Jr., advancesthe thesis that the dialogues that indigenous participated in through the Working Group over the 
have provi
~ed an example of the "
strategic functioning of rightsdiscourse Rights-tal k has
, to paraphrase Wi itsel f in this 
a site of intersubjectivity, a space within which dialogue
(whether conflictual or cooperative) has led to a remarkable
, ifprel iminary and duties of indigenous 
remotel y concei vabl 
What is crucial to note is that this state of affairs has not
been produced by making use of the master
s tools to dismantlethe master s house nor by bui lding 
the master s backyard in a way that seems innocuous and
nonthreatening to the 
parts of the master s house and renovating others whi to build a house across the street that looks a 
master s in some respects but very different in 
Hi 11 
eading cri tical wri ting 
egal academy today, adopts a highlyoptimistic view of the 
Working Group whereby persons, especially acting in 
take mainstream vocabul 
experience and sense of identi ty 
mntion in
the dominant perception of their status and their rights
The Draft Declaration, as it currently 
shifting document. 
detai 1, in part 
almost certainly have been revised by the time these conference
proceedings are publ 
be made. It 
at least as favourable to 
Wi 11 
particular, it should be noted that the lead 
paragraph 1, currently 
Indigenous peoples 
determination, in accordance with international law by
virtue of which they may freely ,
determine theirpolitical status and institutions and fr ely pursue
their economic, social and cuI 
integral part of this is the right to autonomy and
sel f-government. 
When compared to the 
securing language in I.
O. Convention 169 to the effect that thecollective rights of indigenous peoples presumptively do not
Williams, OD. cit. at 701.
3'wi 
Draft Decl OP. ci t. at 46.
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include rights to state sovereignty , this paragraph, if it
survives, will potentially revolutionize the way we think about
sel f-determination 
to suggest is that the revolutionization is not to be found in
the fact that Operative paragraph 1 can easi be argued toincl ude the 
choose plenary statehood if they 
shifting impact will reside in how Operative Paragraph 1 will
creatively interact with the other dimensions of this document,
even if, perhaps especial I , the right to sel does not necessari ly I 
status of many indigenous states
resul ts 
does not provide for 
preferred interpretation, from hheir own 
of " (an)other political status than full statehood, it can
reasonably be assumed that 
societies wi 
My claim is that this status wi 
sovereignty. exist wi and outside States, whi:h is to say that they wi 
rei ation to states. in thecl assical 
classical mode of rights of a 
human rights ' become a rubric inclusive of ' powers ofgovernment' Aboriginal persons wi 
society at I 
societies with which they 
Convention 
Independent Countri es
, 28 Int' I 1384 (1990). Apart
from the qualification peoples as in Countries
" (~ 
provision caustically often referred to Canada clause ' due
to Canada s rol 
Art. 1(3) 
The use of peoples" in 
shall not be construed ' as 
regards the rights which may international 
To use the terminology of the Friendly Relations Declaration
which provides in paragraph four of "The principle of equal rights
and sel f-determination 
The establ State, 
independent State the 
~olitical status freely determined by a people 
modes of impl 
that people.
Declaration on Principles of Relations operation amonq 
Charter of the United Nations , U. A. Res. 2625 24, 1970), reprinted in Int' l Leqal Materials 1292 (1970).
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Aboriginal persons wi vis each other as wellas vis-i-vis states. 
transnational space ' between ' the domestic-international divide,
will have not just human rights of a 
jurisdictional, nature on the domestic plane but also human
rights on the international plane that amount to incidents of
international personal 
Human rights ' and ' sovereignty ' become part of a fused
dialogue over the conditions in which human beings should
interact as human beings, as communi communi ty
and, ul timatel y, and-of-many- communi ties. 
. does such a human rights discourse construct the state
di f ferent ly 
confirm the centrality of the state through a discourse of
substantive claims that presuppose and depend on the state for
their vindication (although it does continue to do that) -- 
also it fashions a discourse of-nO:n-state sovereignty. The
mul 
Declaration might be said to be premised on a set of ideas 
si t 
sovereignty and the status of non-state actors, which 
summarize briefly as 
hierarchical idea of difference between states and indigenouspeoples; (2) coexisting coli ecti 
tied to mul 
collectivities and individuals; 
jurisdiction as well as human rights against governmental
jurisdictions; and 
existing paradigm would be thought of as incidents of
international personal 
sovereignty and which thus construct other-tha~-state sovereignpersons.
Some (many) wi II 
compl exi ty 
The claim will be that the intermingled conceptions in the Draft
Decl 
joined together in one document only because of the lack of
accountability of the process to the dictates of the 
As for the perceptions of irreconcilable contradictions
inherent' in the Draft 
purposes that this is a 
of . coherence and a failure to accept that there nre sustainable
conceptions of coherence based on dialogical 
See Craig Scott, "The Interdependence 
Human Rights Norms: Towards a 
Covenants on Human Rights
, 27 OSQoode Hall Law 868, 804-805(1989), where the putative internal 
Declaration of Human Rights are addressed in 
coherence to a conception of the "global 
communi ty
(A) comprehensive and airtight consistency whereby principles principles... is an 
philosophical coherence.... It 
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could be called ' fluidity angst' , Perry Dane has responded in
terms which I would like to . endorse:
To draw a multiplicity of maps, or recognize a
mul tip I 
variety 
their relations with each other, is complicatedbusiness. 
Indeed, I would posit that it is l ess mystical, 
realistic, more the ordinary stuff of egal craft, than
an approach in which all 
map, and all relations to 
stubborn and impoverished.
I would like to suggest that the comments of Dane tap into a
branch of positivistic pragmatism in international 
scholarship with which I have an on
aoing love-hate relationship,namely that represented by Brownlie ConneI14 . Each'posi ti vism is 
sovereign command school) of egal posi ti vism, 
normative statements out of the disparate indicators thrown up by
the facts of international life. 
international law as beiLg an institutional complex of norms that
stands in some sense above 
by it, at east for purposes of argument and practical 
of disputes. 
which I shall not explore 
for the way everyone of us speaks of international normati 
I east 
al ways found the 
egal personal 
about how identi ty 
discourse in a fashion that can theoretically carve up the 
uni verse 
coherenc~ as requiring a structure of mutually supporting
claims which do not have to flow logically from 
foundation. . .. ' not
treated as absol 
adjustment and )... (i)t
becomes possible to conceive of a kind 
hermeneutical coherence that, 
starting point for a broad 
discourse out of which more universally rooted agreement
as to 
spectrum of rights 
I woul d 1 ike zabeth Kiss
of Princeton Uni 
views on coherence; acknowledgement of her contribution was omitted
due to oversight in the original 
Dane, OP. cit. at 1005.
See , in particular, Recogni tion in Theory Practice , 53 Brit. Yrbk. of Int' l Law 197 (1982).
P. O' Connell, International Law (2nd 
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I t ' person ' is used to refer to
, one 
in ascertaining who or what is competent to Only
the rules of international law can determine 
they may sel di fferent egal functions, so that it is a mistake to
suppose that merely by describing an entity as a
person ' one is formul 
The correct questions should 
of international law establish that this claimant to
capacity has the capacity which it claims? 
exactly is the capacity which it claims and which is
allowed to 
legal relations may this entity enter into? 
claimant to capacity is a novelty there will 
course, no rule of international law on the subject at
all unti l it appears and asserts i 
there arises the question (c), shoOld the entity be
recognised as having the capacity which it have? 
by the other parties to international 
Capacity implies personality, but always it is
capaci ty to 
personal i ty ' as a term is onl 
proposi tion law with legal capacity. 
capaci ty to 
B to perform acts Y afid Z, but not to perform all three.
Thus, any international awyer of the ~ragmatic posi 
variety would lose patience wi 
and impl egal persons to
states (for dichotomy) or to the ul 
are talking about international terri tories, 
intergovernmental organizations I ike the 
Security Council, condominia, minority groups, 
beings corporations and so on, at any given time ' international
law ' parcels out different rights an4 obligations that add up to
produce (or construct) the persons , inquestion. 
reliance on the "ordinary stuff of , to use Dane
phraseology, in order to discern "rules of law" which allocate
capaci ties 
that this reference to international 
speaking that largely fits the argumentative orientation adopted
by those within the particular enterprise that styles itself
international law , the key in the 0' 
reference to extant legal rules but rather the focus on pragmatic
inquiry into claims and recognition of those 
Connell who articulates recognition as being at work only in
the movement from ' not-law ' (political claim and political
Connell, ibid. at Vol. I, 
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response) to ' law , my view is that processes of recognition are
pervasive, continuous and, 1nternational normativity. 
not only with respect to whether or not an incident ofpersonality exists ' in law ' in some general sense but also in
terms of ongoing interpretiv
n processes over what that incidententails in given situations. 
Out of such a focus on intersubjective claim, counterclaim
and (eventual) shared understanding, we begin to see how we
should not be focusing on pi ' states ' but
rather on cumulative, contingent 
constructio~ of personality. beginning with a ' status ' to be recognized and working from there
to the rights and duties attaching to 
easily, in theory and implicitly in practice, consist of a
piecemeal recognition of rights that 
represent the ' nature ' of the enti 
to be accepted that indigenous 
represented on state delegations at international conferences at
which their intefiests (jurisdictional being discussed, right' is recognized 
recognized is one 
Over time, wi 
0 f 
question cumul 
status or kind of entity, i. e. an ' indigenous people , and the
recognition question would then tend to become one that focuses
on a more general personal 
that personality. What 
produce a more concentrated and more collectivized process of
negotiation which has put into 
that could be said to consti 
international personal 
In the process, we have been presented with a document which
emphasizes the variegated nature ot international personhood
. which can 
international life. 
, '
indigenous peopl ehood' , suggests that pI 
especially when phrased in terms of claims of rights tied to
status (sovereignty to 
a particular bundle of rights 
insights that this Draft 
well beyond bringing us back 
truths ' about interna tiona 
quotation of over a quarter of a century 
4' See Johnstone, OP. ci t. for an understanding 
in the 
fai th constructions of rei ving continuous processes
of reciprocal recogni 
See Operative Paragraph o~. cit.
50.
See , e.
g., 
Decl OP. ci t. at 51.
Paragraphs 28, and 32, Draft
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a~ove, the I 
of a richness and novel 
crosses conceptual boundaries in international 
have, as I said at the 
and jurisdictional demarcation. 
of coli ecti 
also citizens of a larger state and persons 
consequence, are bearers of individual human rights vis-a-vis
both states and indigenous communi 
internal' and ' external' -- more transparently transnational
than ever before. ike to suggest, we have a
normative event that should be embr~ced (however pragmatically
and gradual I y) 
e 1 oquen t 1 y 
(W)illingness to draw two 
maps is, as much as 
sovereignty-tal k at its most mature, 
expansive, its most Sovereignty-talk, at its
best comprehends the wi 
hold, in tandem, apparently contradictory images of the
relationship between 
epistemic courage to see that these images need not be
reduced one to the HI e compromiseposi tion 
Arnold Krupat, in his consideration of Bakhtinian dialogism in
the context of literature by and about ' Nati ve Americans , is
critical of one implication of reading such dialogism as
infini te openness" as opposed to "dialogic pI , namel y
that the prescription on the 
purely literary 
seek to 
to establ ish pat 
significant degree of 
the Danian imagery of sovereignty as mul 
nic~ly with the social and political consequences of the
~dialogic pluralism" envisaged by Krupat, namely
Or, worse, ambushed as it passes out of the purer dialogical
space provided by the Working Group into less receptive fora higher
up in the United 
these conference comments form a part 
wi th 
manifestation of domination-free 
that dialogue wi 
space unto i tsel f 
renegade normativity ' which seeks to 
of norms in the Assembly. procedural
sovereignty ' dimensions of ' dialogical sovereignty ' than has been
possibl e in 
51 01), ci t. at 991
- 290 -
cosmopolitanism 52 Dialogism must take us beyond
reify(ing) local identities" or "essentializ(ing) difference
without creating dispositions toward and conditions for reifying
sameness and constructing essentialist universal identities. 
liberate the dialogism latent in human language and human
existence is not to reject normativi 
orthodoxy and t~us to advocate . a "
nterodoxy" as "an absolutecommi 
" . 
dialogism is to seek to foster a pervasive 
~fort with
heterodoxy as "difference within a normative context" a world
where we move (dialogically) from reference point to reference
point and not a world where ne 
absence of reference points. 
ethical and pol tical commi 
as a descriptive claim about life and language? 
cosmopolitan world order" in Krupat' s view?
Cosmopolitanism, then, is the projection of heterodoxy
not to the I 
evel of the " inter-national' . 
the way to cosmopol tanism in social terms is through
the local, from therce to the 
Krupat, OP. cit. at 198, borrowina Paul Rabinow s definition
of cosmopol i 
an 
consciousness (often inescapabilities 
characters, historical trajectories, and 
Paul Rabinow
, "
Representations Are 
Post-Moderni ty in Anthropology
" in Wri tina 
and Poetics of 234, 258 
Marcus eds., 
Rabinow, ibid. at 258.
Krupat, OP. cit. at 199.
Ibid.
When I speak 
point, I do not wish to be taken as saying that cana single (i. e. univocal) reference point on any given 
Rather, we speak and act as if there were such norms, even if we do
so ironically, that is to 
always be internally dialogical. 
high societal displ ay the OP. ci t.
and thus wi II 
others, 
straightforward reflection 
accents. The differencewithin a , to 
becomes one of producing norms 
as great an extent as possible by melding those accents as much as
possible with less privileged 
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heterodoxy is acknowl 
political boundaries of nation-states -- and, after, to
some concretely imaginable cooperation on an 
international scale leading to the cosmopolitan
community, heterodoxy legitimated globally. 
sure, this is to offer a conceptual paradigm -- an
image, a vision -- not a political program; and to
imagine the cosmopol tan pol yvocal pol i ty 
al so utopian 
does not yet exist. 
a contribution to its 
However, in my view, in such a cosmopol tan world order,
. di scourses of 
the argumentative premises provided by a host of ideal notions
such as dignity, 
especially humanity. But 
accomplish would be 
of ' universalism , to prevent either human rights or sovereignby
talk from degenerating as easily as it currently does into an
exercise in projecting 
world (whether this means 
town in Toronto or across the Pacific Ocean) and in too ready
recourse to violence and other forms of coercion as a supposedly
effect~ve and legitimate way to 
world. national dialogue
intersecting with transnational dialogues (produced to a great
extent through non-governmental organisations and the media) in a
way that takes serious 
di fferences 
propositions about what it is to treat individuals as trulyhuman. Similarly, 
individuals can be taken seriously as ~ropositions about what
kind of community should be striven ' at home ' or
abroad' . 
interaction between these kinds of claims which would seem
appropriate in the context of an essay using the status of
aboriginal peoples as a departure point for discussing
sovereignty more generally. 
that points to the val for centuries
before and after the 
American Indians ' were recognized and val 
communi ties , known in some indigenous societies by the French
word berdache and fulfilling "alternative" but respected roles( a)s " . in 
Ibid. at 201. Iris Marion Young,
Justice and the Pol tics of Difference 257-260 (1990) and Elshtain,
OD. cit. at 1376-1378.
58 
See Said, o~. ci t. esp. Freedom From
Domination in the Puture , 282-336. See also Benhabib, o~. ci t.
168:
Without 
struggle for recognition ' in the 
to constitute the 
and fantasy or ignore it in indifference.
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in North America. 
pretending that such ' special' preferred sel f-understanding of most gay and I 
Indians, it nonetheless remains the case that many indigenous
societies as part of their traditions viewed gays and esbians as
equal human beings and valued members of the communi 
when European settler society was profoundly homophobic.
Whatever liberalization of attitudes and laws have begun to occur
in North America in recent decades, it is also the case that gay
and lesbian indigenous persons currently face homophobia from
society at large as well as from their own indigenous
communi ties, 
profoundly modified by contact wi th 
imposed laws and institutions. 
to point out the dual nature of the dialogue that can take 
indeed is currently taking place, at the interface between
respect for aboriginal difference and respect for the humanity of
gays and lesbians. 
a posi tion 
aboriginal societies as statements to the world affirming respect
for the humanity of gays ?nd 
posi tion 
I esbians as statements 
being treated wi 
indigenous societies seeking to be true to or return to their ownhistorical tradition.
The exampl berdache ill ustrates 
a claim about community 
about individual i ty vice versa Beyond this,
the berdache and the contemporary struggl 
and I esbian indigenous persons fi tting berdache was the embodiment
of dialogical i 
berdache ' could well provide another evocative metaphor for
sovereignty itsel f 
One of our traditional roles was that of ' go-between
' -
- individuals who could he~p different groups
communicate wi th 
American Indians) hopes to 
advocates for not American Indian
concerns, as well. 
into a double opportunity 
bridges between communities, to create a place for gay
Indians in both the worl past and secure our future.
I would like to end this essay by suggesting that the metaphor of
the berdache would seem to complement the metaphor of the Gus-
Randy Burns, "Preface " in Li vina the 
Antholoay 1 (Will Roscoe See also the chart, "Tribes
with Berdache Roles
" in Livina the Spirit ibid. at 217-222.
Burns, ibid. at 3.
Burns, o~. cit. at 5.
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Wen-Tah, or Two Row 
Nations spokespersons have 
reconfig~re relations between aboriginalsociety. 
(and, by extension, person~) as a flowing 
autonomy, a river on which soci 
their own 
same general direction. Aided 
can, if 
flotilla of vessels of 
reconceptual ize fundamental rights, abell ed assovereignty I or ' human rights as the river s water thatconnects us and permi 
communication wi th 
